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Introduction
• This paper is part of a long running research 
programme on boundedly rational models, joint with 
Enrique and David.
– It all started with a “numerical coincidence” for the 
Minimum Effort Game (EconLett, 2013)
– It has continued with “this paper”
– It all will end with an paper on an “intuitive contradiction”
The numerical coincidence
• Fatas and Morales (EconLett, 2013) for the Minimum 
Effort Game, Goeree and Holt (2005)
For the logit predictions, estimation of a noise parameter is required. The
objective is to match actual behaviour
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) = min{𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗}− 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
The numerical coincidence
• Fatas and Morales (EconLett, 2013) for the Minimum 
Effort Game, Goeree and Holt (2005)
For Step Thinking, no estimation is needed.  level 1 play = Level 2 = Level 3 …
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) = min{𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗}− 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
The numerical coincidence
• Out of these results, there were two research 
questions
1. Why is the Logit best estimation so close to level k?
2. Why is actual behaviour so close to predictions?
• This paper is about Research Question #1 
Was it just a coincidence??
Nash Play = Perfect best response + Correct beliefs 
Perfect Best Response          Noisy
Naive
Beliefs
Correct Nash QRE
Level-k                             NI
Step-Thinking
• A “simplification” of NE
• Models based on best responses without mutual 
consistent beliefs
– Level-k (Nagel, 1995 and Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995)
– Cognitive Hierarchy (Camerer et al, 2004)
• Types of players:
– L0 players: Typically choose randomly
– L1 type best responds to L0
– Lk types best respond to lower types
Quantal Response Equilibrium 
• A “generalization” of NE
• Choices are positively but imperfectly (errors) related 
to expected payoffs…
– QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995)
– Logit version (Anderson, Goeree and Holt, 2002)
• Fixed point (equilibrium approach)
• is a noise parameterµ
The conventional wisdom 
• Their different nature...
– QRE is an equilibrium model that requires “learning” -> 
Long run 
– Level-k simplifies others’ decisions-> initial stage
• … suggests a differential time horizon
• Experimental literature focuses on their differences:
– Logit QRE: Holt et al…(Goeree and Holt, AER 2001)
– Level-k: Crawford et al (JEL 2014)
The conventional wisdom 
• There is also a “fight” as to which model better 
captures human behaviour within the same time 
horizon (usually in the initial round)
– Crawford et al (2009) on VHBB coordination games
– Arad and Rubinstein’s experiment on “11-20 Game” (2013) 
and Goeree et al’s reaction (2013)
• In this paper, we explore the connections between 
level k and logit quantal response
This paper
• We explore the connections between Level-k and 
Logit QRE
– Schmutzler (GEB 2011): A unified approach to 
comparative statics puzzles in experiments (over a 
wide class of games)
• We focus on point predictions
• The key insight was to realise that the minimum 
game belongs to a particular class of games
– Games with the local payoff property (Anderson et al, 
2002)
Local Payoff Property
• Consider (2-player) games with actions in the interval 
[x, x] with rank-based payoffs, e.g. the payoff to a 
player depends on whether his action is the higher or 
lower action (Anderson et al, 2002)
• Examples are price competition, minimum coordination game, 
traveller’s dilemma, auctions …
• Suppose the expected payoff to player i when he expects player j 
to play according to “mixed strategy” fj can be written as follows
where the α() and β() are additively separable and continuous
• Such a game has the local payoff property
– The expected payoff derivative 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒′ 𝑥𝑥 only depends on the player’s own
decision, on the distribution function F(x), on the density function f(x) evaluated 
at x and on a “shift” parameter ci.
– Example: Minimum effort game
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Local Payoff Property
Logit QRE and Level-k
• Proposition 4 in Anderson et al (2002) is about the 
comparative statics of the logit equilibrium prediction 
wrt parameter 𝛼𝛼
• The conditions required in Prop 4 imply the same 
comparative statics for the level k prediction
Logit QRE and Level-k
• Logit QRE is the solution to the following  
differential equation:
• Level-1 solves the simpler equation:
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The Equivalence Result
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• The most notorious applications of the logit QRE comply with 
these conditions   
• In many applications, the logit equation cannot be explicitly 
solved. But the simpler “level-k equation” can be easily solved


Level-k predictions within games with 
the local payoff property
• A “nice” property of level k predictions within the 
class of games with the local payoff property is that 
level k predictions do not depend on the distribution 
of types in the population
– In games with continuous strategy space, the optimal 
behaviour of higher types in these auction-like games will 
be arbitrarily close the optimal choice of a type-1 player
– There is no freedom of degree
Pure coordination game
(Goeree and Holt, 2005) with n=2
Model
Predicted efforts
𝑐𝑐 = 0.25 𝑐𝑐 = 0.75
LQRE 𝜇𝜇 = 10 150 129
Step Thinking 155 125
Effort interval [110, 170]
Travellers’ Dilemma (Basu, 1994)
• Two travellers have lost their baggage, which happen 
to be identical
• The airline announces that they will be reimbursed 
the lowest of their claims but that a reward R will be 
transferred from the highest to the lowest claimant
• Unique NE for all values of R: lower bound of the 
claim interval (undercutting argument)
Capra et al (1999)
Model
Predicted claims
R=5 R=10 R=20 R=25 R=50 R=80
LQRE (𝜇𝜇 = 10) 181 173 151 136 112 82
Step thinking 190 180 160 150 100 80
Claim interval [80, 200]
Imperfect price competition
• Two firms
• The market price is the minimum price
• The low price firm gets her price (the minimum price)
• The high price firm gets a fraction α of the minimum 
price (In Bertrand, α=0)  
Capra et al, (2002)
Model
Predicted prices
𝛼𝛼 = 0.2 𝛼𝛼 = 0.8
LQRE 𝜇𝜇 = 10 78 127
Step Thinking 88 133
Price interval [60, 160]
Why LQRE is so close to level-k?
• Two points here:
1. Logit QRE predictions are quite insensitive to the 
noise parameter (Within the class of games with the 
local payoff property) within reasonable values
– There is a footnote on this in Anderson et al (2002)
– Within this class, there is no degree of freedom 
(remember Haile et al (AER, 2008))
2. What seems to matter is that some kind of 
randomness is added to the decision making process, 
not the logit structure of LQRE 
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
LQRE is “insensitive” to noise
Randomness, which randomness??
• The level-k predictions are based on the uniform 
distribution
• Level-k was “conceived” for one shot games (or initial 
play) while Logit QRE is for later rounds
• I have shown data on last periods of play and compare 
it with level-k
Recall the numerical coincidence
• Fatas and Morales (EconLett, 2013) for the Minimum 
Effort Game, Goeree and Holt (2005)
For Step Thinking, no estimation is needed.  level 1 play = Level 2 = Level 3 …
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) = min{𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗}− 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
Randomness, which randomness??
• When subjects play a game several times, they may 
learn about two things:
1. About others’ play
2. About the game
• Can we replicate the treatment effects within the class 
of games with the local payoff property in one shot 
games?
– If so, logit beliefs run into problems…  
New experiments - Experimental design
• One-shot games
• Discrete strategy space: (110, 120, 130, … 190, 200)
• Within subject analysis: Subjects made 20 decisions
– They played 5 games (imperfect price competition, minimum
coordination, travellers’ dilemma, “11-20” game and all-pay
auction).
– They played 4 variations for each game:
Player 2 (α2)
Player 1
(α1)
Low, Low Low, High
High, Low High, High
LOW: 20
HIGH: 80
New experiments - procedures
• Experiments conducted at U. of Valencia
• ≈ 1½ hours, 18 – 20 euros
• Four sessions, 224 subjects
• All subjects play all 5 classes of games
– Minimum game, Travelers’ dilemma and Imperfect price 
competition rotated across sessions
– 11 – 20 and All-Pay always last two classes
• No feedback, subjects paid for one randomly selected game 
• All games were played with paper & pencil
• Initial Instructions (on how to read payoff matrices)
• Each class of games was handed out as a separate packet
• Each class had a set of instructions, comprehension 
questions, and four payoff tables.
B1-D1 Participante 2  (20%)
110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
te
 1
 (2
0%
)
110 66 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
66 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
120 22 72 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
110 72 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
130 22 24 78 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
110 120 78 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
140 22 24 26 84 140 140 140 140 140 140
110 120 130 84 28 28 28 28 28 28
150 22 24 26 28 90 150 150 150 150 150
110 120 130 140 90 30 30 30 30 30
160 22 24 26 28 30 96 160 160 160 160
110 120 130 140 150 96 32 32 32 32
170 22 24 26 28 30 32 102 170 170 170
110 120 130 140 150 160 102 34 34 34
180 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 108 180 180
110 120 130 140 150 160 170 108 36 36
190 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 114 190
110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 114 38
200 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 120
110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 120
• Our data –remember, one shot game- looks 
similar to earlier datasets gathered for these 
games –remember, last periods-.
Descriptive results
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Conclusions
• As Holt and coauthors state: “Randomness is key to 
capture intuitive deviations”
• Both level-k and logit QRE include randomness
• Within the class of games with the local payoff 
property 
– Both models share the same comparative statics
– Both models provide similar point predictions
– This suggests that equilibrium beliefs are not needed -> in 
repeated versions of the games, subjects learn about the 
game, not about others’ play
Conclusions
• Thank you very much for your 
attention (and comments )
